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We study the joint dynamics of foreign capital flows and real activity during the recent boom-bust 
cycle of the Spanish economy, using a three-country New Keynesian model with credit-
constrained households and firms, a construction sector and a government. We estimate the 
model using 1995Q1-2013Q2 data for Spain, the rest of the Euro Area (REA) and the rest of the 
world. We show that falling risk premia on Spanish housing and non-residential capital, a loosening 
of collateral constraints for Spanish households and firms, as well as a fall in the interest rate 
spread between Spain and the REA fuelled the Spanish output boom and the persistent rise in 
foreign capital flows to Spain, before the global financial crisis. During and after the global 
financial crisis, falling house prices, and a tightening of collateral constraints for Spanish borrowers 
contributed to a sharp reduction in capital inflows, and to the persistent slump in Spanish real 
activity. The credit crunch was especially pronounced for Spanish households; firm credit 
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After the launch of the Euro in 1999, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and other countries in 
the EU periphery ran sizable current account deficits. This was often accompanied by output 
and construction booms in these countries, and by inflation rates above the Euro Area 
average. In the wake of the global financial crisis (2008-09), private capital flows to the 
periphery countries fell sharply, and a strong contraction in real activity and asset prices 
occurred. This paper provides a quantitative analysis of the joint dynamics of the trade 
balance and real activity in Spain, the largest of the Euro Area countries that received sizable 
capital inflows after the creation of the Euro, and then experienced a sudden stop. We do so 
using a three-country New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
model consisting of Spain, an aggregate of the Rest of the Euro Area (REA) and an aggregate 
of the rest of the world (ROW).1 We estimate the model using quarterly data for Spain, the 
REA and the ROW during the period 1995Q1-2013Q2. The Spanish block of the model has a 
rich structure that allows us to capture the key features of the Spanish boom-bust cycle. In 
particular, we assume a construction sector and a government; Spanish households and non-
financial firms face collateral constraints (à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). The model 
assumes nominal price and wage rigidities, as well as demand and supply shocks in goods, 
labour and asset markets. We use the model as a laboratory for quantifying the key drivers 
and transmission mechanisms that have affected the Spanish economy since 1995. 
The creation of the Euro eliminated intra-Euro Area currency risk and led to a 
convergence of Spanish interest rates to the lower interest rates in the REA. Two other 
competing explanations for the boom in the Spanish economy are loosening credit conditions 
and asset bubbles. Our estimates suggest that these three factors all fuelled a sharp rise in 
Spanish investment and house prices, and increased the fragility of the balance sheets of 
Spanish households and non-financial firms. During the global financial crisis, a fall in 
Spanish asset prices, and a tightening of collateral constraints, led to a sharp improvement in 
the Spanish trade balance and current account, and to a persistent fall in Spanish residential 
and non-residential investment and output. The credit crunch was especially pronounced for 
Spanish households. Firm credit constraints tightened later and more gradually, and 
contributed much less to the slump.    
                                                 
1Throughout this paper, the term ‘Euro Area’ (EA) refers to the 17 countries that were members of the Euro Area 
in 2013. REA is the EA less Spain. 
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Our analysis highlights the key role of domestic asset bubbles (explained in the model 
by exogenous asset risk-premium shocks) for the Spanish boom-bust cycle. In related 
analyses (not based on quantitative models), Reis (2013) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. 
(2013) argue that the pre-crisis boom in Spain (and in other Euro Area periphery countries) 
was largely driven by the convergence of Spanish interest rates to REA rates. While our 
model estimates show that interest rate convergence mattered for Spain, we find that asset 
bubbles and the loosening of credit constraints for households and firms had a more 
pronounced role.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Spanish real house prices continued to 
fall, while equity prices stabilized after 2010. Household deleveraging during this period has 
been achieved through a fall in residential investment, while aggregate consumption as a 
share of GDP has remained comparatively stable. The tightening of firm credit constraints 
during the aftermath of the global crisis was partly off-set by a fall in the risk-premium on 
production capital. During the Spanish sovereign debt crisis, foreign private lending to Spain 
fell sharply—however, credit to Spanish households and non-financial firms was stabilized 
through the massive substitution of foreign private lending by central bank lending. The 
recovery of the world economy and increased productivity growth in Spain also contributed to 
the Spanish trade balance improvement, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.  
Our paper contributes to the literature that quantifies financial shocks before and 
during the financial crisis. By analyzing a wider range of financial shocks (interest rate 
spreads, risk premia on housing and production capital, shocks to collateral constraints of 
households and firms) in an estimated open economy model, we can more precisely identify 
the timing and relative importance of individual financial shocks. In related studies, Justiniano 
et al. (2013, 2014) quantify the effect of household leveraging and deleveraging in the US 
economy, using a calibrated DSGE model.2 These authors emphasize the importance of 
distinguishing changes in credit due to shocks to loan-to-value (LTV) ratios from changes in 
credit induced by asset price fluctuations. Justiniano et al. argue that shocks to LTV ratios per 
se cannot explain the recent boom-bust cycle of US house prices. The results in the paper here 
(for Spain) are consistent with this conclusion. We show that the boom-bust cycle in asset 
prices and real activity is better explained by shocks to risk premia on housing and other 
capital assets. Different from Justiniano et al., the model here also allows for credit constraints 
for firms. The fact that within the Euro Area monetary policy only very partially targets the 
Spanish economy is an additional amplifying mechanism in our model.    
                                                 
2See also Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012) for theoretical analyses of the 
macroeconomic effects of a credit constraint tightening, in a closed economy.  
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Several recent empirical studies have also highlighted the role of housing and credit 
markets for the dynamics of the current account (e.g., Aizenman and Jinjarak (2013), Chinn et 
al. (2013), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010)). The paper here analyzes that role using an estimated 
DSGE model. The present paper is also related to a literature that analyzes current account 
dynamics using DSGE models (e.g., Kollmann (1998), Erceg et al. (2006), Gomes et al. 
(2012)); by contrast to the paper here, that literature has typically used calibrated models (not 
estimated), and it has abstracted from housing markets and the key financial frictions and 
shocks considered in the present model.  
The economic events in Spain (and other European periphery countries) during the 
past 15 years are reminiscent of the boom-bust cycles characterized by capital inflows and 
sudden stops experienced by many economies in Latin America and Asia during the 20th 
century; see Adalet and Eichengreen (2007) for an empirical overview. The theoretical 
literature on sudden stops uses highly stylized models; see, e.g., Calvo (1998). By contrast, 
the present paper analyzes a boom-bust cycle linked to international capital in- and outflows, 
using a fully-fledged estimated DSGE model. Economic theory suggests that a country’s 
external balance reflects domestic and foreign macroeconomic and financial shocks, and the 
structural features of the domestic and foreign economies. This underscores the importance of 
analyzing the external balance using an estimated state-of-the art dynamic general equilibrium 
model that captures the relevant shocks, and their transmission to the macroeconomy.  
The paper here builds on in’t Veld et al. (2012) who analyzed the Spanish business 
cycle using a small open economy model that assumes a housing sector and credit constrained 
household, while firms are not credit constrained. As the creation of the Euro has increased 
financial integration in Europe, the present paper assumes that Spanish households too can 
borrow internationally, subject to collateral constraints (we also assume that firms are 
financially constrained, as mentioned above). In addition, the paper here uses a three-country 
model that allows to better capture the key external shocks affecting Spain. 
Section 2 describes the Spanish macroeconomy since the 1990s. Section 3 presents our 





2.  Dynamics of the Spanish macroeconomy 
For most of the decade up to 2007, GDP growth in Spain exceeded growth in the REA (see 
Fig. 1.a). But the global crisis hit Spain severely, with the year-on-year GDP growth rate 
falling to -4.6% in 2009Q2. Spain experienced a weaker recovery in 2010-11 than the REA, 
and entered into a second-dip recession in 2012. During the Spanish boom years growth of 
domestic demand exceeded GDP growth. In particular the ratios of residential and non-
residential investment to GDP both grew by about 5 percentage points until the financial 
crisis, and then experienced a downward correction of the same amount (Fig. 1.b). By contrast 
the Spanish consumption-to-GDP ratio rose only mildly until the crisis, and then fell slightly.  
The Spanish trade balance/GDP ratio showed a large and persistent decline between the end 
of the 1990s and 2007 (reaching -6% in 2007). The trade balance then rose rapidly in 2008, 
was stable at about -2% until the end of 2010, and then started to improve again, reaching 
positive values in 2012-13 (Fig. 1.c). These trade balance fluctuations were largely driven by 
the sizable rise in Spanish investment during the boom, and the subsequent contraction of 
investment. The Spanish saving rate shows positive co-movement with the investment rate 
(rising during the boom, and falling after the crisis), but fluctuated much less (Fig.1.d).3 The 
Spanish balance of net foreign income and transfers has become gradually more negative 
during the sample period (reflecting Spain’s growing net foreign liabilities). Spain’s current 
account balance has, thus, been smaller than the trade balance; however, the fluctuations of 
the current account are dominated by the dynamics of the trade balance (Fig. 1.c).  
The external deficits prior to the crisis led to a strong rise in Spain’s net foreign 
liabilities--from around 20% of GDP in the mid-1990s to more than 90% of GDP by 2009 
(Fig. 1.e). The rise in the trade balance since the global crisis has stabilized Spain’s net 
foreign liabilities. Flow of funds data show that the sharp increase in Spanish net foreign 
liabilities before the crisis was largely driven by a rise in the net foreign liabilities of the 
Spanish corporate sector, especially of banks; the net foreign liabilities of the financial sector 
reached 50% of annual GDP in 2008Q1, and stayed at about that value until 2011Q2. After 
2011Q2, foreign investors sharply reduced their lending to Spanish commercial banks. Those 
banks then borrowed from the Bank of Spain to repay foreign liabilities, and the Bank of 
Spain borrowed abroad, essentially from the ECB (‘target balances’). This official financing 
stabilized aggregate Spanish net foreign liabilities (see Fig. 1.e).   
                                                 
3The ‘saving’ rate plotted in Fig. 1.d is defined as s≡(GDP-private consumption-government consumption)/GDP, 
and thus NX/GDP=s-investment/GDP, where NX: net exports (all variables are in nominal terms).   
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Spanish inflation (GDP deflator) averaged 3.5% p.a. in 1995-2007, and thus markedly 
exceeded the EA average (2.0%); the financial crisis led to a fall in inflation, below average 
EA inflation (Fig. 1.g). Thus, the Spanish real effective exchange rate appreciated steadily 
during the boom period, and depreciated during and after the bust. High inflation also implied 
that Spain had markedly lower real interest rates than the REA, prior to the financial crisis. 
Real house prices (relative to the GDP deflator) rose by 80% between 2001 and 2008, and 
have been falling steadily since then; by 2012 real house prices had fallen back to their 2003 
values. This suggests that a housing bubble developed in Spain, before the crisis.  
Before the launch of the Euro (1.1.1999), Spanish nominal interest rates were markedly 
higher than rates in the REA. The creation of the Euro led to a convergence of Spanish 
nominal rates to Euro Area rates. The average Spanish government interest rate (interest 
payments/sovereign debt stock) fell from around 9% in the late 1990s to below 4% by 2010, 
but has since risen again (Fig. 1.f). While Spanish households’ borrowing costs have moved 
in line with the ECB policy rate, typically around 200 bps higher, there has been a marked 
increase in interest rates for non-financial firms in recent years, despite falling policy rates.  
Before the crisis, Spain’s public finances were in better health than the Euro Area 
average. Spanish government balances improved markedly between the mid-1990s and the 
mid-2000s (Fig. 1.c). The crisis then led to a sharp deterioration of public finances.  
 
3. Model description   
 
We consider a three-country world consisting of Spain, the rest of Euro Area (REA), and the 
rest of the world (ROW). The Spanish block of the model is rather detailed, while the REA 
and the ROW blocks are more stylized.4 The Spanish block assumes two (representative) 
households, firms and a government. Spanish households provide labour services to firms, 
and accumulate housing capital. The two households have different rates of time preference.  
The more patient household owns the country’s firms, and holds financial assets. The other 
(impatient) household borrows from the domestic patient household and from abroad, using 
her housing capital as collateral. We refer to the patient and impatient household as 
‘Ricardian’ and ‘credit-constrained’, respectively. There is an intermediate goods producing 
                                                 
4The Spanish block builds on the QUEST model of the EU economy (Ratto et al., 2009). Other versions of that 
model have been estimated with US and with German data (in 't Veld et al. (2011); Kollmann et al. (2014)). The 
following presentation abstracts from adjustment costs (for labour and capital) and variable capital utilization 
rates assumed in the estimated model. These features help to better capture the data dynamics. Also, we only 
present the main exogenous shocks. The detailed model is available in the appendix.  
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sector in Spain that uses domestic labour and capital; the sector borrows domestically and 
internationally, using production capital as collateral. A Spanish final good sector combines 
domestic and imported intermediates and produces a homogeneous final good that is used for 
domestic consumption, capital accumulation and exports. Spanish intermediate goods firms 
are monopolists; Spanish wages are set by monopolistic trade unions. Nominal intermediate 
good prices and wages are sticky. All other markets are competitive. The Spanish government 
levies distorting taxes and issues debt. We next present the key aspects of Spanish agents’ 




3.1. Spanish households  
A household’s welfare depends on consumption, hours worked and her stock of housing 
capital. Household h=r,c (r: Ricardian, c: credit-constrained) period t utility, ,htU  is: 
( ) /( 1)( 1)/ 1/ ( 1)/ 111 1ln ( ) ( ) ( ) {(1 ) 1}h h h h L ht t t H t t tU C C s H u L
σ σσ σ σ σ σ κ
κη
−− − −
− −≡ − + + − −  
with 0 1η< <  and 0 , , .h LH ts uκ<  ,
h h
t tC H  
and 1htL ≤  are consumption, the housing stock and the labour hours of worker h in period t, 
respectively. There is habit persistence for consumption. The household’s time endowment is 
normalized at 1, so that 1 htL−  is the household’s leisure. 
L
tu  is an exogenous random 
preference shock (common to both households). All exogenous random variables in the model 
follow independent AR(1) processes. The subjective discount factor of household h=r,c, 
, 1,
h
t tβ +  is an exogenous random variable, with , 1 , 10 1.
c r
t t t tβ β+ +< < <  Date t expected life-time utility 
of household h, ,htV   is defined by , 1 1.
h h h h
t t t t t tV U E Vβ + += +   
 
3.1.1. The Spanish Ricardian household 
The Ricardian household owns all domestic firms, and she holds one-period bonds issued by 
domestic and foreign borrowers. The household’s period t budget constraint is:   
             
,
1(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ,
C r C H H r r r r W r i H K
t t t t t t t t t t t t tp C p I T B r B w L div div divτ τ τ++ + + + + = + + − + + +                (1) 
where 1
r
tB + are nominal bond holdings at the end of date t; the interest rate earned on those 
bonds, 1,tr+  equals the policy rate. All bonds are denominated in Euros. ,H rtI  is the agent’s 
housing investment. The law of motion of her housing stock is , ,1 (1 )
r H r H H r
t t tH I Hδ+ = + − where 
1 1Hδ< <  is the depreciation rate of housing. ,
H
t tp p  and tw  are the final good price, the house 
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price and the wage rate, respectively. Cτ  is a (constant) tax rate on consumption and house 
purchases, while Wτ is the labour income tax rate; rtT  is a lump-sum tax. ,
I H
t tdiv div and 
K
tdiv  
are the dividends of the intermediate goods, construction and investment good sectors.  
 A large body of research finds that house prices (and other asset prices) are not closely 
tied to interest rates or to other macroeconomic fundamentals. For Spain, this is i.a. 
documented by Hott and Jokipii (2012). Building on Bernanke and Gertler (1999), we thus 
assume that housing investment decisions are subject to non-fundamental shocks.5 
Specifically, the Ricardian household’s Euler equation for housing capital is disturbed by a 
stationary exogenous shock (with zero unconditional mean), :Htz   
                              , 1 1 1 , 1 , 11 (1 ) {(1 ) / / }/( / )
H r H H r r H
t t t t t t H t C t t tz E p p U U p pρ δ+ + + + += − − + ,                          (2)    
where , 1
r
C tU +  and , 1
r
H tU +  are marginal utilities of consumption and of housing in t+1, while 
, 1 , 1 , 1 ,/
r r r r
t t t t C t C tU Uρ β+ + +≡  is the household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (external 
habit formation is assumed). We refer to Htz  as a ‘housing risk premium’ shock, and to house 
price changes driven by Htz  as housing ‘bubbles.’ Bubbles can, e.g., be interpreted as 
representing expectational biases (waves of optimism or pessimism) regarding future housing 
returns. A rise in  Htz  could also capture what Gorton (2010) calls a ‘panic’,  i.e. a rise in 
subjective uncertainty about future asset prices which leads investors to dump these assets, 
thus leading to a fall in asset values. 
 
3.1.2. The Spanish credit constrained household 
The impatient household borrows domestically and internationally, subject to collateral 
constraints indexed to the value of her housing stock, H ct tp H : 
, ,
1 1
c d c d H c
t t t tD p Hχ+ +≤  and 
, ,
1 1 1,
c f c f H c
t t t tD p Hχ+ + +≤  where 1
c




tD +  denote the household’s domestic and foreign debt, at 
the end of period t. , ,, 0c d c ft tχ χ >  are domestic and foreign loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. We posit 
separate domestic and foreign borrowing constraints, in order to disentangle the role of 
domestic and foreign credit supply shocks for the Spanish economy. These constraints are 
                                                 
5This is admittedly a simple (but widely used) short-cut for generating asset bubbles. Tractable micro-
foundations for big time-varying risk-premia in large-scale DSGE models such as ours have not yet been 
developed. Adam et al. (2011) study simple models with learning (and near-rational beliefs) that can generate 
persistent and large asset price swings. Integrating this mechanism into the model here is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, but would be an interesting avenue for future research.  
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assumed to always bind in equilibrium (to ensure this, we posit that the rate of time preference 
of the constrained household is markedly greater than that of Ricardian and foreign agents).  
   The period t budget constraint of the constrained household is  
                      
, , , , ,
1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) (1 ) ,
C c C H H c c c c d c f c d c f W c
t t t t t t t t t t t tp C p I T r D D D D w Lτ τ τ+ ++ + + + + + + = + + −                 (3) 
where , 1 (1 )
H c c H c
t t tI H Hδ+≡ − −  and 
c
tT  are housing investment and a lump sum tax, respectively. 
c
tr  is the interest rate on household loans. We assume that domestic and foreign lenders 
charge the same household loan rate (available loan rate data do not allow to distinguish 
between rates charged by domestic and foreign lenders).  That rate equals the policy rate plus 
an exogenous spread, ctspr : ;
c c
t t tr r spr= +  this is a short-cut for modeling costly financial 
intermediation.6 The credit-constrained household’s Euler equation for housing capital is 
disturbed by the same bubble shock Htz  as the Ricardian household’s Euler condition.  
 
3.2. Spanish firms  
3.2.1. Intermediate goods producers  
In Spain, there is a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by [0,1]j∈  that are imperfect 
substitutes. Each good is produced by a single firm. Firm j has technology 
1( ) ( ) ,j j jt t t tZ K N
α αθ −=
where , ,j j jt t tZ K N  are the firm’s output, capital stock and labour input. Total factor 
productivity (TFP), 0,tθ >  is exogenous and common to all firms. As all firms face symmetric 
decision problems, they make identical choices; we thus henceforth omit the firm superscript j 
(the superscript i indicates that a variable pertains to the intermediate goods sector). In period 
t, an intermediate good firm issues domestic and foreign debt, denoted by , 1
i d





respectively. It faces the collateral constraints , ,1 1,
i d i d K
t t t tD p Kχ+ +≤  
, ,
1 1,
i f i f K
t t t tD p Kχ+ +≤                                              




tχ are the firm’s domestic and foreign LTV 
ratios. The law of motion of production capital is 1 (1 ) ,
K K
t t tK K Iδ+ = − +  with 0 1,
Kδ< <  where KtI  
is gross investment. The period t dividend of an intermediate good firm is 
                             , , , ,1 1 (1 )( ) ,
i i i d i f i i d i f K K i
t t t t t t t t t t t t t tdiv p Z D D r D D w L p I p κ+ += + + − + + − − −                        (4)        
                                                 
6Kollmann et al. (2012) and Kollmann et al. (2013) develop models with a banking sector, in which interest rate 
spreads reflect bank operating costs. For simplicity, the paper here does not explicitly include a banking system. 
Here, we treat spreads as taxes on debt levied by borrowers; those taxes are rebated to borrowers in a lump sum 
fashion (lump sum taxes in borrowers’ budget constraints are expressed net of those rebates).   
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where the (domestic and foreign) loan rate paid by the firm, ,itr  equals the policy rate plus an 
exogenous spread, :itspr .
i i
t t tr r spr= +
i
tp  is the price charged by the firm, while 
K
tp  is the price 
of production capital. At t, the firm faces a downward sloping demand curve for her output, 
with exogenous price elasticity 1tε >  that equals the substitution elasticity between different 
intermediate good varieties (see below). The firm bears a real cost 21 12 ( (1 ) ) /
i i i
t P t t tp p pκ γ π −≡ − +  
(in final good units) of changing her price, where π  is the steady state inflation rate.  
The firm maximizes the present value of dividends , 1 1 1( / ) ,
i i
t t t t t t t tV div E p p Vρ + + += + ⋅ ⋅  where 
, 1
i
t tρ +  is a stochastic discount factor that is strictly smaller than the intertemporal marginal rate 
of substitution of the Ricardian household: , 1 , 1(1 ) ,
i i r
t t t t tzρ ρ+ += −  where 0 1
i
tz< <  is an exogenous 
random variable. itz  might reflect a ‘principal agent friction’ (Hall (2011)) between the owner 
and the management of the firm. The firm’s Euler equations for debt and capital are:   
                 ,, 1 1 11 (1 ) ( / )(1 ) ,
i r i i d
t t t t t t t tz E p p rρ λ+ + += − + +  
,
, 1 1 11 (1 ) ( / )(1 ) ,
i r i i f
t t t t t t t tz E p p rρ λ+ + += − + +            (5) 
  , , ,, 1 1 1 1 1 11 (1 ) ( / ){(1 1/ ) / (1 ) / } ,
i r i K K K i d i i f i f
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tz E p p p MPK p p pρ ε δ λ χ λ χ+ + + + + += − − + − + + +Ψ      (6) 
where , ,, 0i d i ft tλ λ ≥  are the Lagrange multipliers of the domestic and foreign collateral 
constraints; 1 11 1 1( ) ( )t t t tMPK K N
α αθ α − −+ + +≡  is the date t+1 marginal product of capital. The 
term tΨ  depends on the future marginal price-adjustment cost ( tΨ  is zero, in steady state). 
We assume that the wedge itz  is sufficiently big, so that the collateral constraints always bind 
in equilibrium.7 
i
tz  induces fluctuations in the price of capital that are not related to 
(conventional) fundamentals; we thus refer to itz  as the ‘non-residential capital risk premium’ 
shock.   
Price stickiness implies that the inflation rate of local intermediates, 1ln( / )
i i i
t t tp pπ −≡
obeys an expectational Phillips curve, 1 1( ) ( / ),
i i i i i i
t t t t tE p MC εεπ π ρ π π ϑ+ −− = − + −  up to a linear 
approximation. Here itMC  is the marginal cost on intermediate good firms and /( 1)ε ε −  is the 
steady state mark-up factor. iρ  is the steady state subjective discount factor of intermediate 
good firms, and 0iϑ >  is a coefficient that depends on the cost of changing prices. 
 
                                                 
7An alternative assumption ensuring binding collateral constraints would be that firms have a tax incentive to 
issue debt (tax deductibility of interest payments); see Jermann and Quadrini (2012).   
11 
 
3.2.2. Spanish production of new capital goods 
New residential and non-residential capital is generated using final output. Let ( )H H H Ht t tJ Iξ=Ξ ⋅  
and ( )K K K Kt t tJ Iξ=Ξ ⋅  be the amounts of final output needed to produce 
, ,H H r H c
t t tI I I≡ +  and 
K
tI  
units of residential and non-residential capital, respectively. Hξ  and Kξ  are increasing,  
strictly convex functions, while HtΞ  and 
K
tΞ are exogenous shocks. The prices of housing and 
production capital are '( )H H H Ht t tp Iξ=Ξ  and '( ).
K K K H
t t tp Iξ=Ξ The dividends of the two 
investment good sectors are H H H Ht t t t tdiv p I p J= −  and ,
K K K K
t t t t tdiv p I p J= − respectively.  
 
3.2.3. Spanish final good sector 
The final good is produced using the technology 1/ ( /( 1) 1/ ( 1)/ /( 1)(( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ) ,d dt t t t tY s D s M
ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν− − −= + −  with 
0.5 1.dts< <
1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
{ ( ) }t t t tjt tD Z dj
ε ε ε ε− −= ∫  is an aggregate of the local intermediates, where 1tε > is the 
exogenous substitution elasticity between varieties; tM  is a composite of intermediates 
imported from the REA and the ROW. The home bias parameter dts  is an exogenous random 
variable. The price (=marginal cost) of the final good is 1 1 1/(1 )( ( ) (1 )( ) ) ,d i d mt t t t tp s p s p
ν ν ν− − −= + −  
where mtp  is the import price index. The final good is used for domestic consumption and 
investment, and exported: ,
r c H K
t t t t t t tY C C G J J X= + + + + +  where tG  and tX  are government 
consumption and exports, respectively. 
 
3.3. Wage setting in Spain 
We assume a trade union that ‘differentiates’ homogenous labour hours provided by the two 
workers into imperfectly substitutable labour services; the union then offers those services to  
intermediate good-producing firms--the labour input tN  in those firms’ production functions 
is a CES aggregate of these differentiated labour services. The union sets nominal wage rates 
of the differentiated labour services to maximize the sum of the expected life-time utilities of 
the two workers, subject to a quadratic cost of changing the wage rate. This implies that the 
(log) growth rate of the nominal wage rate, 1ln( / ),
w
t t tw wπ −≡ obeys the  wage Phillips curve, 
1( ) ,
w w w w w w
t t t w tE zπ π β π π λ+− = − +  up to a (log-)linear approximation; here
wβ  is a weighted 
average of the two households’ discount factors, wπ  is steady state wage inflation, and 0wλ >  
is a coefficient that depends on the cost of changing nominal wages; wtz  is the gap between a 
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weighted average of workers’ marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure, 
and the real wage rate. 
 
3.4. Spanish Government 
The period t government budget constraint is 1(1 ) ( )
g g g W r c
t t t t t t t tr D p G D w L Lτ++ + = + + +            
, ,{ ( ) ( )} ,C r c H H r H c r ct t t t t t t tp C C p I I T Tτ + + + + +  where 1
g
tD + is government debt; the interest rate paid by 
the government equals the policy rate plus an exogenous spread, :gtspr .
g g
t t tr r spr= +  Before the 
launch of the Euro, Spanish sovereign debt rates exceeded the REA rates. In December 1995 
the EU Council announced that the Euro would irrevocably be launched on January 1, 1999. 
During the 1996-1998 run-up to the Euro, the spread between Spanish and REA sovereign 
debt yields was gradually eliminated—the spread was close to zero between the launch of the 
Euro and the 2010 eruption of the Spanish sovereign debt crisis.  
Government consumption and lump-sum taxes respond to GDP growth and to public 
debt. Real government consumption is set according to the following policy rule:  
        
1
1 1 54( ) ( ln( / ) ) ( /( ) ) ,
G G G G G G G g G
t t Y t t Y D t t t tc c c c Y Y g D p Y Dρ τ τ ε− − −− = − + − − − +
                   
(7) 
where /Gt t tc G Y≡  denotes government consumption normalized by real GDP, while Yg   is the 
steady state quarterly growth rate of GDP; Gtε is a white noise disturbance.
8  
 
3.5. Euro Area monetary policy 
Euro Area (EA) monetary policy is set as a function of EA inflation and GDP growth, 
according to an interest rate feedback rule:  
       1 11 4 44 4(1 ) (1 )[ ( ln( / ) ) ( ln( / ) )] ,
R R R R EA EA r EA EA EA R
t t t t Y t t Y tr r r P P Y Y gπρ ρ ρ τ π τ ε− − −= − + + − − + − +        (8) 
where EAtP and 
EA
tY  are the EA CPI and EA real GDP; 
R
tε is a white noise disturbance. 
 
 3.6. The REA and ROW blocks 
The models of the REA and ROW economies are simplified structures with fewer shocks; 
specifically, the REA and ROW blocks each consist of a New Keynesian Phillips curve, a 
budget constraint for a representative household, demand functions for domestic and imported 
goods (derived from CES consumption good aggregators), and a production technology that 
uses labour as the sole factor input. The REA and ROW blocks abstract from capital 
                                                 
8The estimated model also assumes government investment (set according to a rule similar to (7)); government 
capital raises the productivity of intermediate good producers.  
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accumulation. In the REA and the ROW there are shocks to labour productivity, price mark-
ups, the subjective discount rate, the relative preference for domestic vs. imported goods, as 
well as monetary policy shocks.    
 
3.7. Exogenous shocks 
The estimated model assumes 44 exogenous shocks. Other recent estimated DSGE models 
likewise assume many shocks (e.g., Kollmann (2013)), as it appears that many shocks are 
needed to capture the key dynamic properties of macroeconomic and financial data. The large 
number of shocks used here is also dictated by the fact that we use a large number of 
observables (39) for estimation, to shed light on different potential causes of the Spanish 
boom-bust cycle. Note that the number of shocks has to be at least as large as the number of 
observables to avoid stochastic singularity of the model. 
 
4.  Model solution and econometric approach 
 
We compute an approximate model solution by linearizing the model around its deterministic 
steady state. Following the recent literature that estimates DSGE models (e.g., Smets and 
Wouters (2007)), we calibrate a subset of parameters to match long-run data properties, and 
we estimate the remaining parameters using Bayesian methods.9 The 39 observables used in 
estimation are listed in the Data Appendix. The estimation uses quarterly data for the period 
1995Q1- 2013Q2.   
Specifically, we calibrate the model so that steady state ratios of main economic 
aggregates to GDP match average historical ratios for Spain. The Spanish steady state ratios 
of private consumption, residential investment and non-residential investment to GDP are 
calibrated at 59.0%, 6.9% and 12.1%, respectively. The steady state shares of Spanish and 
REA GDP in world GDP are 1.3% and 13.0%, respectively. The steady state trade share 
(0.5*(exports+imports)/GDP) is set at 28%, and the quarterly depreciation rate of residential 
(non-residential) capital is 2.5% (1.0%). We set the steady state government debt/annual GDP 
ratio at 60% of GDP. The Spanish steady state real GDP growth rate and inflation are set at 
0.55% and 0.5% per quarter respectively.  
The steady state rates of time preference of the Spanish Ricardian household and of 
foreign (ROW and REA) agents are set at 0.5% per quarter. The steady state rates of time 
preference of the credit-constrained household and of intermediate goods firms are set at a 
                                                 
9 We use DYNARE (Adjemian et al., 2011) to solve the linearized model and to perform the estimation.  
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markedly higher value, 4% per quarter, to ensure that the collateral constraints of these agents 
bind in all periods. The steady state private [government] borrowing rate spread is set at 
0.45% [0%] per quarter.  The average ratio of the bank debt of non-financial firms divided by 
the productive capital stock is 0.75, in the Spanish data. We thus set the steady state total firm 
LTV ratio (sum of domestic and foreign LTV ratios) at 0.75. 34.6% of the liabilities of  
Spanish banks were foreign, during our sample period; hence, we set the steady state foreign 
LTV ratio of Spanish firms at 0.26 (=0.346*0.75), and the steady domestic LTV ratio of firms 
at 0.49 (=0.75-0.26). Calza et al. (2013) report that the typical LTV ratio for Spanish housing 
loans is 0.70. We thus set the Spanish steady state ‘total’ household LTV ratio at 0.70. We 
estimate the steady state household domestic LTV ratio through the lens of our model. The 
key results are robust to changing the steady state LTV ratios (in a reasonable range).   
 
5. Estimation results 
 
5.1. Posterior parameter estimates 
The posterior estimates of key structural parameters are reported in Table 1. (Estimates of all 
other parameters can be found in the appendix.) The steady state consumption share of the 
Ricardian household is estimated at 0.52. Estimated habit persistence is sizable ( 0.73),η=  
which indicates a sluggish adjustment of consumption to income shocks. The substitution 
elasticity for housing services σ  is estimated at 0.56, i.e. consumption and housing are 
complements. Most forcing variables are highly persistent; e.g., the estimated autocorrelations 
of the (exogenous) LTV ratios and interest rate spreads are in the range of 0.9. According to 
the estimates, innovations to LTV ratios are volatile (standard deviations in the range of 4%-
6%). The model estimates also suggest substantial nominal and wage stickiness.10 The model 
properties discussed in what follows are evaluated at the posterior mode of the model 
parameters.11  
 
5.2. Dynamic effects of financial shocks 
The model predicts standard responses of macroeconomic variables to TFP shocks and to 
monetary and fiscal policy shocks. We thus focus here on financial shocks that played a key 
role for the boom and bust cycle of the Spanish economy. Fig. 2 shows responses to negative 
                                                 
10 The price and wage Phillips curves here are observationally equivalent to Phillips curves implied by Calvo 
(1983) price/wage setting. Our estimates imply a (Calvo) average price and wage change interval of 4 quarters. 
11 We also computed model-implied statistics (impulse responses, variance decompositions and historical 
decompositions) at random parameter sub-draws of the Metropolis sample. Posterior means of those statistics are 
very close to statistics evaluated at the posterior mode of the model parameters (results available on request).   
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shocks to risk premia on housing and non-residential capital and to the interest rate spread 
facing private Spanish borrowers, as well as to positive shocks to LTV ratios. All responses 
pertain to 1 standard deviation exogenous innovations. Responses of the trade balance 
(normalized by GDP) and of the real household loan rate represent differences from 
unshocked paths; responses of other variables are expressed as relative deviations from 
unshocked paths.  
The financial shocks considered in Figure 2 all boost aggregate demand in Spain, and 
lower the Spanish trade balance—however, they have differing effects on the composition of 
aggregate demand. Given nominal rigidities, the rise in aggregate demand triggers a persistent 
rise in Spanish GDP and employment; the demand boost also raises Spanish inflation (at least 
initially), and hence induces a Spanish real exchange rate appreciation. These responses are 
consistent with key facts about the Spanish economy, prior to the financial crisis, namely 
strong growth, high inflation and a deteriorating trade balance. 
 
Negative shock to Spanish housing risk premium (positive house price bubble), Fig. 2.a.   
A fall in the Spanish housing risk premium Htz  (see (2)) raises Spanish residential investment 
and the Spanish house price. The housing boom crowds out private consumption (as 
households devote a greater share of their income to the purchase of new houses), and hence 
the saving rate (saving/GDP) rises. Non-residential investment rises weakly on impact, before 
falling persistently below the unshocked path. This is due to the fact that Spanish real interest 
rates fall in the short term, due to the rise in Spanish inflation, but rise over the medium term 
(as the price level reverts towards its pre-shock path). However, the total investment rate 
(total investment/GDP) rises strongly, due to the much more pronounced rise in residential 
investment, and the trade balance falls.     
 
Negative shock to risk premium on non-residential capital, Fig. 2.b. 
A fall in the risk premium on Spanish non-residential capital itz  (see (5),(6)) strongly raises 
non-residential investment and the price of capital. Consumption and residential investment 
are crowded out initially, but rise in the medium run (due to the persistent rise in GDP). The 
initial fall of consumption (and its subsequent modest rise) imply that the saving rate rises. 




Negative shock to private borrowing rate spread in Spain, Fig. 2.c.  
Fig. 2.c shows the effects of a negative simultaneous shock to the Spanish private borrowing 
spreads ( ctspr  and ).
i
tspr  This shock induces a simultaneous rise in private consumption and 
in residential and non-residential investment. The saving rate falls, and the investment rate 
increases, and thus the trade balance deteriorates. 
 
Positive shocks to Spanish household/firm loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, Fig. 2.d. & 2.e  
Shocks to firm LTV ratios and to household LTV ratios have different effects. However, 
domestic and foreign LTV ratio shocks have identical macroeconomic consequences. This 
follows from the fact that the Ricardian household is indifferent between lending domestically 
or internationally, and has free access to the international financial market. We view these 
model features as realistic, given the absence of exchange rate uncertainty and the high degree 
of financial integration in the Euro Area. In response to an expansion in the foreign LTV 
ratio, the constrained household/firm borrows more abroad. When a rise in domestic LTV 
ratios occurs, the higher loan demand is indirectly funded abroad, as the Ricardian household 
accommodates the rise in domestic loan demand, by borrowing abroad (or by reducing her 
international lending). Thus, domestic and foreign LTV ratio shocks have the same effects on 
aggregate demand and on GDP, i.e. only total LTV ratios matter for real activity.  
Fig. 2.d shows that a positive shock to the credit constrained household’s LTV ratio 
raises aggregate consumption and residential investment, but that it crowds out non-
residential investment; the saving rate and the total investment rate fall.12 A loosening of the 
borrowing constraint faced by Spanish firms boosts investment in productive capital, but it 
(initially) crowds out consumption and residential investment (Fig. 2.e). However, the rise in 
non-residential investment exceeds the fall in residential investment, and thus the total 
investment/GDP ratio rises; due to the fall in consumption, the saving rate rises too. Positive 
shocks to household and firm LTV ratios both worsen the trade balance.  
 
In summary, reductions in risk premia on Spanish residential and non-residential 
capital, and a rise of the firm LTV ratio all raise the Spanish saving and investment rates. By 
contrast, a rise in the household LTV ratio lowers the saving and investment rates. A negative 
shock to Spanish interest rate spreads lowers the saving rate, but raises the investment rate.  
 
                                                 
12Steady state non-residential investment is twice as large as residential investment; the fall in non-residential 
investment and the rise in GDP dominate the rise in residential investment, and the total investment/GDP ratio 
falls.   
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5.3. Business cycle moments implied by posterior parameter estimates 
Table 2 reports model-predicted and empirical standard deviations of key Spanish, REA and 
ROW macroeconomic variables, as well as their correlations with Spanish GDP. The 
empirical statistics are based on quarterly data for 1995Q1-2013Q2. (The statistics for all 
variables, except net exports/GDP, pertain to logged first differences.) Empirically, the 
growth rates of Spanish private and government consumption and investment are more 
volatile than Spanish GDP growth; these variables are all positively correlated with Spanish 
GDP growth. Spanish net exports (normalized by GDP) are highly volatile, and weakly 
countercyclical. Spanish inflation (GDP deflator) is less volatile than the GDP growth rate, 
while the growth rate of the Spanish house price and the rate of appreciation of the Spanish 
effective nominal exchange rate are more volatile than GDP growth. Spanish GDP growth is 
positively correlated with REA GDP growth, but uncorrelated with ROW GDP growth.  
The estimated model captures most of these empirical regularities rather closely. In 
particular, it captures the fact that Spanish domestic demand components are more volatile 
than Spanish GDP, and it also matches the high volatility of Spanish net exports, of the 
Spanish house price and of the Spanish effective exchange rate. 13 
 
5.4. Variance shares accounted for by different shock types 
Table 3 reports the percentage shares of predicted variances (of variables considered in Table 
2) that are accounted for by different types of exogenous shocks. We group together related 
shocks, for the sake of legibility. Specifically we consider these (groups of) shocks originating 
in Spain: (1) Housing risk premium; (2) (Non-residential) Capital risk premium; (3) 
Household LTVs; (4) Firm LTVs; (5) Interest rate spreads; (6) TFP and investment efficiency 
(‘Technology’); (7) Price mark-up; (8) Wage mark-up; (9) Fiscal policy; (10) All shocks 
originating in the REA and the ROW, as well as shocks to trade flows due to changes in the 
Spanish final good home bias (see Section 3.2.3) are summarized in a group labeled ‘Trade’; 
(11) the remaining shocks are markedly less important for the main Spanish variables, and are 
hence combined into a category labeled ‘Other’ shocks. 
 Spanish financial shocks (shocks to risk premia, LTV ratios and spread) explain about 
20% of the variance of Spanish net exports and of growth rates of Spanish GDP and hours 
                                                 
13 The model-predicted correlation between Spanish and REA GDP growth (0.12) is positive but smaller than the 
empirical correlation (0.69). This reflects the assumption that shocks originating in Spain and in the REA are 
independent. Standard open economy models are generally unable to generate realistic cross-country output 
correlations, when independent shocks are assumed (e.g., Kollmann (2013)). Empirically, aggregate supply and 
demand shocks are positively correlated across countries. Model versions with correlated Spanish and REA 
shocks generate realistic cross-country output correlations.   
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worked, and 12% of the variance of Spanish inflation; about half of those variance shares are 
accounted for by shocks to Spanish LTV ratios and interest rate spreads.  Household LTV 
shocks account for 40% of the variance of Spanish consumption growth. Firm LTV shocks 
account for a non-negligible share of the variance of non-residential investment (5%), but 
matter very little for the other variables. About 80% of the variances of Spanish non-
residential investment growth is driven by non-residential capital risk premium (bubble) 
shocks, while an equivalent share of the variance of residential investment growth and of the 
growth rate of house prices is accounted for by housing risk premium shocks.  Only about 6% 
of non-residential investment variance is explained by LTV and spread shocks. 
Trade shocks account for about 30% of the variance of Spanish GDP growth. 
Although foreign factors play a non-negligible role, fluctuations in Spanish real activity are 
thus largely driven by local factors--domestic technology shocks (8%), price mark-up shocks 
(12%) and fiscal policy shocks (11%) account for non-negligible Spanish GDP variance 
shares. As Spanish GDP is much smaller than REA and ROW output, more than 98% of the 
variance of REA and ROW GDP growth and inflation is driven by REA and ROW shocks.   
 
5.5. Decomposing Spanish historical time series 
To quantify the role of the different shocks as drivers of historical Spanish macro data, we 
plot the estimated contributions of the 11 groups of shocks described in Section 5.4 to the 
following Spanish time series: the nominal trade balance divided by nominal GDP; nominal 
GDP minus private and government nominal consumption normalized by nominal GDP 
(referred to as ‘saving rate’ in what follows); nominal total investment divided by nominal 
GDP (‘investment rate’); the year-on-year GDP growth rate; the real exchange rate. See Fig. 
3.a-3.e, where lines with black lozenges show the historical data. In each Figure, the 
horizontal line represents the steady state value (of the variable plotted in the Figure). Vertical 
bars above the steady state (horizontal) line represent positive shock contributions to a 
variable, while bars below the horizontal line represent negative contributions. Sums of all 
shock contributions equal the historical data.  
 As discussed in Section 2, the dynamics of the Spanish trade balance is dominated by 
a sizable expansion of the investment rate during the boom period, and a subsequent sharp 
correction. The historical decomposition shows that negative shocks to risk premia (bubbles) 
on housing and non-residential capital were major drivers of the long-lasting Spanish 
investment boom before the 2008-09 global financial crisis (see Fig. 3.c), and thus these 
shocks contributed noticeably to the gradual worsening of the Spanish trade balance (Fig. 
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3.a). In 2007 (i.e. just before the start of the financial crisis), the bubble shocks contributed 
roughly -2 percentage points to the observed Spanish net exports/GDP ratio of close to -6%. 
(The housing risk premium shock was the main driver of the expansion of residential 
investment and of the real house price in Spain, while the non-residential capital risk premium 
shock was the main driver of the rise in non-residential investment.)     
Shocks to LTV ratios too had a noticeable effect on saving, investment and the trade 
balance, during the boom phase. For the saving rate and the trade balance, the household LTV 
ratio shocks mattered more than firm LTV shocks. According to our estimates, the late 1990s 
saw a tightening of household LTV ratios, as is evident from the growing positive 
contribution of household LTV shocks to the Spanish saving rate (Fig. 3.b) and trade balance 
between 1997 and 1999. However, after 1999 (launch of the Euro), the estimates indicate a 
gradual loosening in household LTV constraints that lasted until the financial crisis.14 During 
the global financial crisis, a sharp tightening of household LTV constraints occurred. 
According to the estimates, firm LTV constraints too tightened in the late 1990s and then 
loosened gradually. (This manifested itself in a negative contribution of the firm LTV shocks 
to saving and investment rates in the late 1990s that subsequently became less negative, and 
then turned positive in 2004.) However, that loosening only had a non-negligible positive 
effect on the saving and investment rates in the last two years before the financial crisis—and 
even then its effect on the trade balance remained very modest.  
During the boom phase, the convergence of Spanish rates to REA rates (i.e. negative 
shocks to Spanish borrowing rate spreads) had a sizable and persistent negative effect on the 
Spanish saving rate, and a smaller positive effect on the investment rate; thus, the spread 
shocks made a significant and persistent contribution to the deterioration of the Spanish trade 
balance, during that phase: between the late 1990s and the financial crisis, the spread shocks 
lowered the Spanish trade balance/GDP ratio by about 2.3 percentage points.  
Our estimates suggest that the expansion in Spanish loan demand triggered by the 
housing and non-residential capital bubbles and by falling spreads was not counteracted by a 
tightening of LTV ratios; given the magnitude of asset price increases, the resulting credit 
expansion was substantial. Especially after 2004 we even identify a sizable ‘active’ credit 
loosening, in the form of a marked rise in LTV ratios, that accentuated the worsening of the 
Spanish trade balance. According to our estimates, technology or fiscal policy shocks only 
had a very minor influence on Spanish saving and investment rates in the boom phase.   
                                                 
14 Fig. 3.a. and 3.b. show that, after 1999, the contribution of the household LTV shocks to the trade balance and 
the saving rate became smaller over time, and turned negative in 2005. As discussed in Section 5.2., a rise in the 
household LTV ratio lowers the trade balance and the saving rate.   
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Negative risk premium shocks and the loosening of LTV constraints also contributed 
noticeably to strong Spanish GDP growth before the financial crisis (see Fig. 3.d). The boom 
saw strong growth in the employment of unskilled labour that was also fuelled by 
immigration. Hence, average Spanish labour productivity and measured TFP fell during the 
boom years. The model interprets the strong employment growth (accompanied by low 
productivity growth) as induced partly by a fall in the wage mark-up. 
As discussed above (and documented in Fig. 3.e), the Spanish real effective exchange 
rate appreciated steadily until 2009, and then depreciated until 2013. The appreciation during 
the boom reflects strong domestic demand driven i.a. by the fall in Spanish interest rate 
spreads and in housing risk premia, as well as the rise in household LTV ratios. Low 
productivity growth during the boom also contributed to high Spanish inflation and the real 
exchange rate appreciation (but low wage mark-ups had an offsetting effect on inflation).  
 The 2008-09 ‘Great Recession’ was characterized by a strong decline of the Spanish 
investment rate. Our estimates suggest that this was largely driven by a rise in housing and 
non-residential capital risk premia that triggered a fall in the value of capital. In addition, 
household LTV constraints tightened sharply in 2008. This combination of shocks explains 
also the relatively modest fall of the Spanish savings rate in 2008-2009. Due to the strong 
decline of investment, the trade balance improved markedly in 2008 (the global trade collapse 
during the recession also contributed to this). The 2008-09 drop in Spanish GDP too is mostly 
explained by the financial factors--in particular by a tightening of household LTV constraints, 
and the rise in risk premia on housing and non-residential capital. Firm credit constraints 
tightened later and more gradually, and contributed much less to the slump. 
While the non-residential investment/GDP ratio began to recover gradually after 2009, 
residential investment (and house prices) continued to fall after 2009 and thus exerted a drag 
on total investment and on GDP over the whole remaining period. In addition, Spanish 
interest rate spreads started to rise during the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis. However, 
financial shocks only explain a small part of the persistent Spanish output slump, in the 
aftermath of the 2008-09 recession. Our estimates suggest that, after 2009, fiscal austerity, 
and a rise in price and wage mark-ups too had a strong negative effect on GDP growth.15 
While the fall of the total investment rate continued to contribute to external rebalancing, in 
the aftermath of the 2008-09 recession, a drop in the saving rate partly offset the fall in the 
investment rate. (Two major facts explain the fall in the saving rate, namely the continued fall 
                                                 
15 The model predicts that GDP falls when price and wage mark-ups rise. The negative contribution of mark-up 
increases to GDP growth during and after the recession is clearly noticeable in Fig. 3.d. Spanish firm-level micro 
data also suggest a rise in price mark-ups after the financial crisis; see Montero and Urtasun (2013).   
21 
 
in house price, and the muted fall in Spanish wages, interpreted in the model as a rise in the 
wage mark-up, that stabilizes the consumption of credit-constrained households.)  After 2010, 
Spanish net exports were also positively affected by a rise in export demand, due to the 
gradual recovery of the world economy, and by strong Spanish productivity growth--these 
factors also had a positive influence on GDP growth, and on the saving rate (as collateral 
constraints and habit persistence dampen the expansion of consumption, in response to a 
positive productivity shock).  
 
 
5.6. Sensitivity analysis: the role of shocks to risk premia and to loan-to-value ratios 
We also estimated a model variant without housing and non-residential capital risk premium 
(bubble) shocks. That model variant fits the observables less well than the baseline model. 
The log marginal likelihood (ML) of the baseline model is 5356.34, while the log ML of the 
model variant without bubble shocks is 5210.14. (The ML measures the out-of-sample 
predictive ability of the model.) This implies a Bayes factor (ratio of posterior odds to prior 
odds) of 146.20e   that massively favours the baseline model. In the ‘no-bubbles’ model variant, 
the estimated variances of household and firm LTV ratios are close to 100%, and thus 
unrealistically large. The predicted standard deviations of the GDP growth rate (0.81%), 
residential investment growth (7.90%), the net exports/GDP ratio (4.43%) and of other key 
macro variables are larger than in the baseline model, and hence less close to the empirical 
moments (0.66%, 2.82% and 3.74%, respectively), which also indicates that the ‘no-bubbles’  
variant fits the data less closely.   
 In addition, we considered a model variant with constant household and firm LTV 
ratios (while allowing for residential and non-residential bubble shocks). The log ML of that 
model variant is 5314.24. Hence, that variant too fits the observables less well than the 
baseline model—though better than the ‘no-bubbles’ model variant. Compared to the baseline 
model, the model version without LTV shocks likewise generates predicted standard 
deviations of key macro variables that are larger and less close to the data (predicted standard 
deviations of GDP and residential investment growth, and of the net exports/GDP ratio: 
0.80%, 3.39% and 5.99%).  
Overall, these experiments suggest that residential and non-residential capital risk premium 
shocks are more important than exogenous LTV ratio shocks for explaining the volatility of 





6. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has used an estimated three-country New Keynesian model with financial frictions 
to study the joint dynamics of foreign capital inflows and real activity during the recent boom-
bust cycle of the Spanish economy. The estimates suggest that a falling risk premium on 
Spanish housing capital, a loosening of collateral constraints for Spanish households and 
firms, as well as the fall in the interest rate spread between Spain and the REA fuelled the 
persistent rise in foreign capital flows to Spain during the boom that preceded the global 
financial crisis. During and after the global financial crisis, falling house prices, and a 
tightening of collateral constraints for Spanish borrowers contributed to a sharp reduction in 
capital flows to Spain, and to a persistent slump in Spanish real activity. The credit crunch 
was especially pronounced for Spanish household; firm credit constraints tightened later and 















Data Appendix  
The model is estimated using GDP (real and deflator) growth rates and GDP (real and 
nominal) shares. Specifically, the following 39 variables are used as observables:  
●GDP growth (3) (Spain, REA and ROW),  
●GDP shares (13): trade balances (Spain, REA, ROW), consumption, government 
consumption, government investment, transfers, construction investment, total investment, 
government deficit and debt, net foreign asset, loans to firms. 
●Prices (10): GDP (Spain, REA, ROW), consumption, import, export, construction, house, 
government purchases, total investment. 
●Spain, REA, Euro-Area and ROW (US) money market rates (3 months); Spanish 
government bond rates; Spanish household and firm loan rates (7). 
●Effective exchange rates (Spain and REA), wages, employment, number of retirees and 
number of labour market non-participants (6).  
The effective exchange rate, the ROW price index and ROW GDP are based on trade-weighted 
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Table 1.  Prior and posterior distributions of key model parameters 
 
                                             Prior distributions                            Posterior distributions 
                                   Distribution    Mean           s.d.                   Mean           s.d. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Household preferences 
η  Beta 0.70 0.10 0.73 0.05 
κ  Gamma 1.00 0.40 1.31 0.39 
σ  Gamma 0.50 0.10 0.56 0.11 
 
Steady state consumption share of Ricardian households 
/rC C  Beta 0.50 0.10 0.52 0.05 
 
Autocorrelations of forcing variables 
,( )c dρ χ  Beta 0.85 0.07 0.88 0.06 
,( )c fρ χ  Beta 0.85 0.07 0.90 0.05 
,( )i dρ χ  Beta 0.85 0.07 0.86 0.08 
,( )i fρ χ  Beta 0.85 0.07 0.92 0.04 
( )csprρ  Beta 0.85 0.07 0.84 0.05 
( )isprρ  Beta 0.85 0.07 0.93 0.01 
 
Standard deviations (%) of innovations to forcing variables 
,( )c dsd χ  Gamma 4.0 1.6 5.58 2.38 
,( )c fsd χ  Gamma 4.0 1.6 5.85 1.84 
,( )i dsd χ  Gamma 4.0 1.6 4.16 1.65 
,( )i fsd χ  Gamma 4.0 1.6 5.87 1.94 
( )csd spr  Gamma 1.0 0.3 0.83 0.19  
( )isd spr  Gamma 1.0 0.3 0.92 0.92 
 
Notes: Cols. (1) lists model parameters; ( ), ( )x sd xρ  are the autocorrelation of variable ‘x’ and the 
standard deviation of the innovation to x, respectively. ,c dχ and ,c fχ  are the exogenous LTV 
ratios facing Spanish credit constrained households when borrowing from domestic and foreign 
lenders, respectively. ,i dχ and ,i fχ : corresponding domestic and foreign LTV ratios for Spanish 
intermediate good producing firms. cspr and ispr : interest rate spreads for loans to the Spanish 
credit-constrained household and intermediate goods-producing firms. Col. (2) show the 
distribution function of the prior. Cols. (3) and (4): means and the standard deviations (s.d.) of the 
prior distributions of listed parameters. Cols. (5) and (6): means and standard deviations of the 
posterior parameter distributions (computed using Random Walk Metropolis algorithm, 400000 







Table 2.  Model-predicted and empirical business cycle statistics (1995Q1-2013Q2) 
                                                              Model                                                         Data  
                                                 Standard            Correl. with                       Standard            Correl. with 
                                                 deviation, %      Spanish GDP                    deviation, %       Spanish GDP 
            (1)                                              (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Spanish variables                         
GDP 0.74 1.00 0.66 1.00 
Consumption (private)    1.07 0.51 0.91 0.80 
Government consumption 1.46 0.41 1.09 0.34 
Non-residential investment 3.00 0.49 2.82 0.73 
Residential investment 4.14 0.46 3.15 0.72 
Hours worked 0.74 0.75 0.93 0.92 
Net exports/GDP 3.94 -0.03 3.74 -0.15  
 
Nominal exchange rate 4.44 -0.20 4.20 -0.04 
GDP deflator  0.77 0.10 0.48 0.60 
House price 2.54 0.15 2.59 0.58 
 
REA variables  
GDP 0.85 0.12 0.64 0.69 
GDP deflator 0.39 0.13 0.30 -0.03  
 
ROW variables 
GDP 1.00 0.19 0.79 0.07 
GDP deflator 2.09 0.17 1.89 0.22  
 
Note: For the variables listed in Column (1), the Table reports model-predicted standard deviations and 
correlations with Spanish GDP (Columns (1)-(2)) and the corresponding empirical statistics based on 
quarterly data for the period 1995Q1-2013Q2 (Columns (3)-(4)). The statistics for all variables except net 
exports/GDP pertain to logged first differences of these variables. ‘Inflation’ is a quarter-to-quarter rate. 
The ‘Nominal exchange rate’ is the effective exchange rate between Spain and the ROW (a rise represents a 


















Table 3.  Shares (in %) of model-predicted variances accounted for by different shock types 
 
                                                                 Financial shocks                                                   
                                          Housing    Capital       House-                     Interest                                                                                                                   All          LTV &    
                                          risk              risk          hold          Firm        rate           Tech-      Price         Wage        Fiscal                                               financial     spread 
                                         premium   premium     LTV         LTV       spreads     nology   mark-up    mark-up     policy      Trade        Other                shocks        shocks 
             (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Spanish variables            
GDP 4.11 5.80 7.98   0.38 0.66 7.98 12.40 4.80 11.10 29.86 14.88 18.95 9.03 
Consumption (private)    6.05 0.74 40.26 0.47 2.32 2.63 2.89 0.71 0.90 20.45 22.53 49.86 43.06 
Government consumption 3.82 1.21 1.84 0.24 0.56 2.79 5.74 8.82 61.79 8.22 4.90 7.69 2.65 
Non-residential investment 0.22 79.18 0.43 5.04 0.81 0.84 3.37 0.83 0.19 7.95 1.08 85.70 6.29 
Residential investment 81.95 0.07 5.61 0.04 0.34 0.12 0.41 0.21 0.07 1.17 9.96 88.03 6.00 
Hours worked 5.49 5.18 9.43 0.33 0.77 6.28 16.84 13.25 4.80 19.45 18.13 21.22 10.54 
Net exports/GDP 6.74 2.89 4.68 0.62 9.65 0.98 3.64 4.56 7.38 54.68 4.14 24.60 14.95 
 
GDP deflator  2.48 2.24 6.28 0.18 0.65 16.64 25.11 17.62 2.55 19.78 6.43 11.84 7.12 
House price 74.24 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.05 0.68 0.41 0.48 0.13 2.32 21.41 74.55 0.26 
Nominal Exchange rate  0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 98.62 1.23 0.07 0.03 
 
REA variables                  
GDP 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 98.29 1.57 0.03 0.01 
GDP deflator 0.47 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.84 0.39 0.11 0.19 0.41 95.14 2.13 1.60 0.99 
 
ROW variables 
GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GDP deflator 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note:  this Table reports % shares of the model-predicted variances of variables listed in Column (1) that are accounted for by the types of shocks listed above 
Columns (2)-(14). The sum of the shares listed in Columns (2)-(13) is 100%. Column (13) reports the variance share explained by financial shocks (Columns (2)-
(6)), while Column (14) shows the variance share explained by LTV shocks and by shocks to Spanish interest rate spreads (sum of Columns (4)-(6)).  
See Section 5.4 for discussion of shock types. The variances of all variables except net exports/GDP pertain to logged first differences of these variables. ‘Inflation’ 
is a quarter-to-quarter rate. The ‘Nominal exchange rate’ is the effective exchange rate between Spain and the ROW (a rise represents a Spanish appreciation). REA: 




   
Figure 1 Spain: 1995Q1-2013Q2 
Fig. 1.a. Year-on-year GDP growth (%): Spain and REA 
 
Fig.  1.b Real demand shares % (ratios to real GDP, base yr. 2000) 
 
I [IH]: non-residential [housing] investment; C: consumption      
 
Fig.  1.c Trade balance (TB), current account (CA) and gov’t  
deficit (GOC), % GDP 
 
Fig. 1.d  Savings, investment, net exports, %  GDP 
 
 
Fig. 1.e Net foreign claims against Spanish sectors, % GDP 
BoS: Bank of Spain, GOV: general government; HH: households; 
Corp: private corporations 
 
Fig. 1.f Nominal interest rates,% p.a.   
Borrowing rates:  Spanish households (HH), non-fin. firms (NFC),  
 government  (GOV). Bank of Spain (BoS) & ECB policy rates  
 





Figure 2. Impulse responses to financial shocks 
Figure 2.a. Negative shock to Spanish housing risk premium 
 
Figure 2.b Negative shock to risk premium on Spanish non-resident capital 
 
Figure 2.c.  Negative shock to Spanish private interest rate spread 
 























































Trade balance (% GDP)










Real effective exchange rate









Real interest rate (bp)



















































Trade balance (% GDP)







Real effective exchange rate







Real interest rate (bp)






















































Trade balance (% GDP)








Real effective exchange rate













Figure 2.d. Positive shock to Spanish household foreign loan-to-value ratio 
 
 
Figure 2.e. Positive shock to Spanish firm foreign loan-to-value ratio 
 
 
Note: A Spanish real appreciation is represented by a rise in the real exchange rate. The ‘real 
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Figure 3. Historical decompositions  






























   
 
 


































   
 
 



































   
 
 









































Note:  The lines with black lozenges show the historical data. Thin horizontal line represents steady state 
values. Vertical bars show contributions of different types of shocks to the historical data. Vertical bars 
above the horizontal (steady state) line represent positive shock contributions to the historical data, while 
bars below the horizontal line represent negative contributions. The (groups of) shocks are describes in 















   
 
 


































q   q  _
 
 


























APPENDIX                                       
 
A. Detailed model description 
B. Detailed list of shocks 
C. Detailed list of estimated parameters 
D. Additional historical decompositions 
 
A. Detailed Model Description  
 
We consider a three-country world consisting of Spain, the rest of Euro Area (REA), and the 
rest of the world (ROW).16 The Spanish block of the model is rather detailed, while the REA 
and the ROW blocks are more stylized, it assumes two types of households that provide 
labour services to firms, and accumulate housing capital. The households have different  rates 
of time preference. The more patient household owns the country’s firms, and holds financial 
assets. The other (impatient) household borrows from the domestic patient household and 
from abroad, subject to collateral constraints. The model captures that fact that Spain is part of 
a monetary union. We assume that Spain is small relative to the rest of the EA—Spain thus 
faces an exogenous foreign interest rate. Spain has a fiscal authority that purchases final 
output, levies distorting taxes and issues debt; fiscal policy is described by policy (feedback) 
rules. Unless otherwise specified, the exogenous variables in the model follow independent 
AR(1) processes: 
                                                     1
x x x x
t t tu uρ ε−= + , 
with xtε being a white noise with constant variance. 
 
A.1 Firms 
A.1.1 Intermediate goods producers  
Firms operating in the final goods production sector are indexed by j. Each firm produces a 
variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute for varieties produced by other 
firms. Because of imperfect substitutability, firms are monopolistically competitive in the 
goods market and face a downward-sloping demand function for goods. Domestic final good 
producers sell the goods and services to domestic and foreign households, investment and 
construction firms and governments. 
Output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function using firm capital jtK , 
employment jtL   and public infrastructure tKG   as inputs:  
(1) 11( ) ( ) ( ) Gj j j Y jt t t t t t tY A ucap K U L KG
αα α −−= . 
where tA  is exogenous total factor productivity (TFP). The economy-wide labour-augmenting 
productivity shock Ytu  follows a random walk with drift.  
Employment at the firm level jtL  is a CES aggregate of labour supplied by individual 














where 1θ > determines the degree of substitutability between different types of labour. The 
firms also decide about the degree of capacity utilization ( jtucap ).  
The output of the final goods sector tY  is a CES aggregate of the output of individual firms j : 
                                                 
16The model is an extension of the QUEST model of the EU economy (Ratto, Roeger and in 't Veld, 2009). Other 
versions of that model have similar version has been estimated with US data (in 't Veld, Raciborski, Ratto and 












≡   
 
∫ , 
where η  indicates the degree of substitutability between the varieties j  that determines the 
steady-state price mark-up of final goods and gives the demand for individual varieties as: 
(4) ( )j jt t tY p Y
η−= . 
The firms invest jtI into productive capital. The capital stock evolves according to: 
(5) 1(1 )
j j K j
t t tK I Kδ −= + −   
with Kδ being the rate of capital depreciation adjusted by trend population and productivity 
growth. 
The firms face technological and regulatory constraints that restrict the price setting, 
employment, investment and capacity utilization decisions. The following convex functional 
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. 
Intermediate good firms can issue debt. The incentive to issue (corporate) debt arises 
from that fact that the return on production capital exceeds the risk-free rate (see below). 
Intermediate good firm j issues debt domestically and abroad and faces the following 
collateral constraints:  
 
(7a)       ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,1 11 1 1NF NF j NF NF NF j NF NF XINF K jt t t t t t t t tr B r B u p Kτ τ χ− −+ ≤ + + − +                
and 
 (7b)    ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , , , ,1 11 1 1NF F NF F j NF F NF F NF F j NF F NF F XINF F K jt t t t t t t t tr B r B u p Kτ τ χ− −+ ≤ + + − +                
 
with ,0 , 1NF NF Fτ τ≤ < , ,NF jtB  and 
, ,NF F j
tB  are the firm’s domestic and foreign debt at the end of 
period t,  on which the following real interest rates are paid: 
 (8a)                                             NF NFt t tr r risk= +  
 (8b)                                          ,NF F F NFt t tr r risk= + , 
with tr  being the domestic  real risk-free rate, 1F Ft t t tr i E π += −  is the foreign risk-free interest 
rate and the nominal foreign rate, Fti , is defined as a sum of  REA and ROW rates, weighted 
by the relative shares of foreign loans to Spanish firms: 
 
                                 , ,F REA B REA ROW B ROWt t ti s i s i= + . 
The risk premium is subject to an exogenous disturbance: 
 (9)                                     NF NF NFt trisk risk u= +  
with  NFtu following an AR(1) process. 




tu  which describe time varying credit conditions.    Debt is denominated in 
units of real GDP. Throughout the paper, prices denoted by lower-case letters are deflated by 
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the GDP deflator, e.g, /K K Yt t tp P P≡  is the price of one unit of capital in units of GDP; 
/j j Yt t tp P P≡ (see below) is the price of intermediate good j in GDP units etc.  
The period t dividend of intermediate good producer j, denoted by ,jtdiv  is given by  
                  
, , , , , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) ( )
j j j NF j NF F j NF NF j NF F NF F j j K j P j L j div j
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tdiv p Y B B r B r B w L r K κ κ κ− − − −= + + − + + − − − + + ,                          
(10)              
where  tw  and 
K
tr  are the real wage rate, and the real rental rate of capital, respectively.  
Firm j maximizes the present value of dividends, denoted jtV :  
 (11)                                                  , 1 1
j j j
t t t t t tV div E Vρ + += +    
where , 1t tρ +  is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the intermediate firm (owned 
by the patient households), subject to an exogenous shock UCtu . In each period of time, firm j  
decides about capital, investment, labour demand, capacity utilization, loans and product 
prices optimally given the production technology, adjustment costs and the demand function 
for firm output. 
The first-order conditions from the maximization of (11) under (1) and (4)-(10) are: 
(12)       
( ) ( )
1
,1 ,2 1
, , , .
1( 1)( ( 1)) (1 )
1
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
j j I
j j j k jt t t
t t ucap ucap t t t tI j k I
t t t t
NF NF NF NF NF F NF F NF F NF F
t t t t t t
Y pq ucap ucap t E q
p K r p
u u
ε δγ γ α δ




+ − + − = − + + +
+








j K j jt tI
t K I t t tj r I
t t t
I pq I E I
K r p
γγ δ γ + +
−




1 1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) 1
j j
K w j jt t L
t t t L t t t t tj r
t t
Yt w u w L E w L
L r
ε α γγ + +− + = − ∆ + ∆+
 
(15) ,1 ,2(1 ) ( 2 ( 1))
j j
j jt t




εα γ γ− = + −  
(16) 11 1
1 1(1 )(1 ( )) ( ( (1 ) ) )
1
j K j j jtP
t t t t t t t tr
t t
Yt u sfpE sfp E
r Y
ε γε π π π
η η
+
+ −= − − + − + − −+
 
(17)        ( ) ( )( ), 1 1(1 ) 1 1 1NF NF NF NF NF NFt t t t t t t tr E r rλ ρ τ λ+ ++ = − + − +  
(18)      ( ) ( )( ), , , , , ,, 1 1(1 ) 1 1 1NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF Ft t t t t t t tr E r rλ ρ τ λ+ ++ = − + − +  
where tw  is the real wage, jtε  is the inverse of the steady-state price mark-up and sfp  the 




tλ  are the Lagrange multipliers related to the domestic and foreign collateral 
constraint, respectively. 
 
A.1.2 Residential construction  
Monopolistically competitive firms h  in the residential construction sector use new land LtI  
sold by (Ricardian) households and final goods ContJ  to produce new houses with a CES 
technology: 
(19) 




LL LLH L Con






= + −  
 
 
The providers of construction services are monopolistically competitive and face quadratic 
price adjustment costs:  
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(20) 21( ) ( )
2
Con Con Con
t Con tadj P Pγ= ∆  . 
The stock of available land is determined by the exogenous growth of land supply less the use 
of land in current construction: 
(21) 1(1 )
L gL L
t t t tLand g u Land I−= + + −  
The first-order conditions for the demand for construction services and land and for the 


















σ−= −  
(24) 1 1
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1
Con pcon Con Con Con
t t Con t t t tr
t
p u sfpconstrE sfpconstr
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(26) 1 1 1/(1 )( ( ) (1 )( ) )
L L LH L Con
t L t L tp s p s p
σ σ σ− − −= + −  
where sfpconstr  is the degree of forward-looking behavior in the formation of construction 
price expectations and ltr  the real return on land. New and existing houses are perfect 
substitutes. Households can make capital gains or suffer capital losses depending on house 
price fluctuations. 
 
A.1.3 Investment goods producers  
There is a perfectly competitive investment goods production sector which combines 
domestic and foreign final goods, using the same CES aggregator as private consumption (see 
below), to produce investment goods for the domestic economy. Denote the CES aggregate of 
domestic and foreign inputs used by the investment goods sector with inptI , then real output of 
the investment goods sector is produced by the following linear production function:  
(27) inp PIt t tI I U=  
in which PItU  is a technology shock specific to the production technology for investment 
goods, which follows a random walk 1
PI PI PI
t t tu u ε−= + . The price of investment goods relative 
to consumption goods follows as: 
(28) I PI Ct t tp U p= . 
 
 
A.2 Final good sector 
The final good sector combines the domestically produced intermediate goods and a 
homogeneous imported intermediate goods to produce a final good using the technology 
(29)                             
11 1 1 ( 1)
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
M
M M M
MM M Md IM d IM






− − − 
 = − + − +
  
, 




−= ∫  is an aggregate of the domestically produced intermediates. 
tM  are (real) imports. The home bias parameter, ds can be subject to random shocks IMtu .  
 
A.2 Trade 
Competitive exporters buy final domestic output and transform it into exportables using a 
linear technology, so that export prices are given by: 
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(30)                  , 1 1 11/(1 ( (1 ) ))
X PX X X X
t t PX t t t t t tp u sfpxE sfpxγ ρ π π π+ + −= − − + − − ,  
where PXtu  is a price setting shock, PXγ  quantifies the price adjustment cost and sfpx is the 
degree of forward-looking expectations .  
Importers buy foreign goods at quantity tM  and sell them on the domestic market charging 
the price: 
(31)                   , 1 1 11/(1 ( (1 ) ))
M PM M M M
t t PM t t t t t tp u sfpmE sfpmγ ρ π π π+ + −= − − + − − ,  
where, similarly as above, PMtu is a price setting shock, PMγ  quantifies the price adjustment 
cost and sfpm is the degree of forward-looking expectations. 
We allow some inertia ( Mγ ) in the demand for imports, defined as: 
 (32) ( )
1
1





d M M C M C t t
t t t t t t t t t tC C
t t









= − + + + 
 
, 
while Spanish exports are defined as a function of the imports of REA from Spain, ,REA EStM , 
and ROW imports from Spain, ,ROW EStM : 
 
(33)                   , ,( / ) ( / ),REA ES REA ES ROW ES ROW ESt t tX M size size M size size= +  
where imports from Spain in the two foreign regions are defined as the respective bilateral 
trade shares, ,REA ESst  and ,ROW ESst  of total imports in the two regions. 
We assume white noises disturbances in the import equations for REA and ROW to allow for 
a shock in the Spanish exports. 
 
A.3  Households 
There are two households that have different rates of time preference.  We refer to the patient 
and impatient household as the ‘Ricardian’ and the ‘credit constrained’ household, 
respectively. Household welfare depends on final good consumption, the stock of housing 
capital (households are owner-occupiers), and hours worked. There is habit persistence for 
consumption. The period utility of household h=r,c (r: Ricardian; c: credit constrained) is:  
(34) 
                   
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1
1( , , ) log exp( ) ,
H
H H H
H H Hh h h h h h h L h h h
t t t t t H t t tU C H L C C s H u L L
σ
σ σ σ κ
σ σ ση ϑ




= − + + ⋅ −  
   
 
         
     
 
where ,h ht tC H  and 
h
tL  are the date t consumption, housing stock and hours worked of 
household h. The household’s time endowment is ,hL  and thus  h htL L−  is the household’s 
leisure. Ltu  is a preference shock (that is common to both households).  
A trade union ‘differentiates’ homogenous labour hours provided by the households 
into imperfectly substitutable labour services, and then offers these services to the 
intermediate goods-producing firms. The union sets nominal wage rates of the differentiated 
labour services to maximize the sum of the expected lifetime utilities of the two workers, 
subject to independent Calvo (1983) wage adjustment schemes for each type of differentiated 
labour (Kollmann, 2001, 2002). The households bear real costs to adjusting the nominal wage 
(see below).   
 
A.3.1 Ricardian household 
The Ricardian household has full access to financial markets. She holds domestic government 
bonds, ;GtB  bonds issued by domestic non-financial firms, ,
NF
tB  by the other domestic 
household, ,ctB  and by foreign households, FtB  (foreign bonds are denominated in foreign 
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output). The Ricardian household also owns the production capital tK  used in the 
intermediate goods production sector as well as the stock of land, ,tLand  which is still 
available for building new houses. All domestic firms are owned by the Ricardian household, 
i.e. that household receives all dividends of the intermediate goods sector ( )tdiv and of the 




respectively. In addition the household receives a lump-sum transfer , .LS rtT   The Ricardian 
household’s date t expected life-time utility, ,rtV  is , 1( , , ) ,
r r r r r r
t t t t t t t tV U C H L E Vβ += +  where 
, 10 1
r
t tβ +< <  is the household’s subjective discount factor between periods t and t+1. , 1
r
t tβ + , 
subject to a random shock UCtu that adds exogenous changes to intertemporal consumption 
path. The period t budget constraint of the Ricardian household is 
  (35)             
,(1 ) (1 ) ( )c C r I r H c H r G c NF Ft t t t t t t t t t t tp C p I p I B B B rer Bτ τ+ + + + + + + + =  
                       1 1 1 1 1 1(1 )( ) (1 ) ((1 ) )
G c NF F F K K K K I r
t t t t t t t t t tr B B B r rer B i p Kτ τ δ− − − − − −+ + + + + − − +           
                        
, ,(1 )W r W r L Land H LS rt t t t t t t t tw L p J div div Tτ κ+ − − + + + + .                                   
The budget constraint is written in real terms (with all prices expressed relative to the GDP 
deflator). trer  is the (GDP deflator-based) real exchange rate between Spain and the ROW. 
,W r
tκ  is the wage adjustment cost borne by the Ricardian household.17 
L
tp  is the price of land. 
(Recall that Kti is the rental rate of capital.) The laws of motion of the stocks of production 
capital, housing capital and land owned by the Ricardian household are 1(1 ) ,
r r r
t t tK J Kδ −= + −
, ,
1(1 )
r H r H H r
t t tH J Hδ −= + −  and  1(1 ) ,L Landt t t tLand g Land J−= + −  respectively.18 
r
tI  and 
,H r
tI  
represent real investment expenditures in production capital and housing capital while  rtJ and 
,H r
tJ are the gross increases in the stocks of production and housing capital. There are convex 
capital adjustment costs. Investment expenditure is given by 
(36a)                                     21 1 , 12 2(1 ( / )) ( ) /
r r r r r r r
t t K t t J K t t tI J J K J J Kγ γ −= + + − ,                                          
(36b)                            , , , , , 21 1 , 12 2(1 ( / )) ( ) / .
H r H r H r r H r H r r
t t H t t J H t t tI J J H J J Hγ γ −= + + −                               
Welfare maximization gives standard first-order optimality conditions for consumption, 




Empirically, Spanish (non-)residential investment is not closely tied to the risk-free interest 
rate. Like, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1999), we thus assume that investment decisions are 
subject to non-fundamental shocks. Specifically, the Euler equations for residential and non-
residential investment are disturbed by stationary exogenous shocks Ktz  and 
H
tz :  
(37a)                                , 1 11 (1 ) { (1 ) (1 ) }/
K r K K K K K K K
t tt t t t tz E P i Pβ δ τ τ δ+ += − − + − + ,                       
 (37b)                               , 1 , 11 (1 ) { (1 )}/
H r r H H H
t t t t H t t tz E U P Pβ δ+ += − + − ,                               
                                                 
17The total wage adjustment cost borne by the two households is 21 1 12 [( ) / ] ;Wt W t t t tW W W Yκ γ − −≡ −  the Ricardian 
household bears a fraction /( )r r ct t tC C C+  of that cost, i.e.  , /( ).W r W r r ct t t t tC C Cκ κ≡ ⋅ +  
18 We assume that the stock of constructible land grows at the exogenous rate Ltg  between periods t-1 and t. 
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where KtP  and  
H
tP  denote the price of production capital and  the house price, respectively 
and , 1
r
t tβ +  is the rate of time preference of Ricardian households. We assume that the 
unconditional mean of  Ktz  and 
H
tz  is strictly positive: 0.
K H
t tEz Ez= >  Following Bernanke and 
Gertler, we use the term "bubble" to denote deviations of asset prices from fundamentals 
driven by Ktz  and .
H
tz  These disturbances can, e.g., be interpreted as representing 
expectational biases (waves of optimism or pessimism, panics) regarding future investment 
returns.19  
 
A.3.1.2 Interest rate on foreign bonds 
The Spanish Ricardian household faces a nominal interest rate on foreign bonds (denominated 
in foreign currency): 
 (38)                                  F ROW ROWt ti i risk= + ,                                       
where ROWti  is the interest rate in the ROW and ROWrisk is an exogenous risk term describing 
the willingness of the ROW to lend to Spain (See below for discussion of the determinants of 
ROW policy rate.)   
 
A.3.2 Credit constrained household 
The credit constrained household has a higher rate of time preference than the Ricardian 
household , 1 , 1(0 ).
c r
t t t tβ β+ +< <  The date t expected life-time utility of the credit constrained 
household,  ctV  is defined by , 1( , , ) .
c c c c c c
t t t t t t t tV U C H L E Vβ += +  The credit constrained household 
borrows an amount tB  from the Ricardian household, subject to the collateral constraint:  
(39)                                  ( )1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ,c c c c c c c XIC H ct t t t t t tr B r B u p Hτ τ χ− −+ ≤ + + − +  
 with 0 1cλ≤ < , and borrow FtB from abroad, facing the collateral constraint: 
 
(40)                        ( ), , , , , , , ,1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ,c F c F c F c F c F c F c F XIC F H ct t t t t t tr B r B u p Hτ τ χ− −+ ≤ + + − +  
where we assume that credit constrained households face an interest rate spread on their loans: 
(41)                                              c ct t tr r risk= +  
and  
(42)                                           ,c F F ct t tr r risk= + , 
where ctrisk is subject to an exogenous disturbance: 
,c c risk c
t trisk risk u= + .  
As for non-financial firms, households face time varying loan-to-value ratios, subject to 
exogenous disturbances, XICtu and 
,XIC F
tu . 
 The period t budget constraint of the credit constrained household is:  
 (43)  
, , , , , ,
1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c C c H H H c c c F c c c F c F W c W c LS c
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tp C p I B B r B r B w L Tτ τ τ κ− − − −+ + + + + = + + + + − − + .  
The law of motion of the housing stock owned by the credit-constrained household is 
,
1(1 ) .
c H c H c
t t tH J Hδ −= + − The credit constrained household faces housing adjustment costs that 
                                                 
19 A rise in Ktz  and Htz  is also observationally equivalent to what Hall (2010) refers to as "principal agent 
frictions", which he models by introducing an exogenous wedge between the returns on safe assets (government 
bonds) and risky assets (equity and houses) in order to capture rising spreads between safe and risky assets 
during the financial crisis.    
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are similar to the adjustment costs borne by the Ricardian household; her housing investment 
decisions are affected by the same non-fundamental shock as the decisions made by the 
Ricardian household.  
The credit-constrained households maximize welfare  as the discounted sum of expected 
period utility subject to the constraints (40)-(43). The first-order conditions for consumption 
and housing are: 
(44) , 1 1 1, 1
, 1
(1 (1 ) ) (1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
c c C C
C tc t t t t
t t t tc c c C C
C t t t t t t
U r t pE E
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1
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t C t t t t t t t
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t c F H
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− + − + −
= + + +





where ctψ and 
F
tψ  are the Lagrange multipliers of the domestic and foreign collateral 
constraint, respectively. 
 
A.4 Wage setting 
Trade unions are maximizing a joint utility function for each type of labour i . It is assumed 
that types of labour are distributed equally over Ricardian and credit-constrained households 
with their respective population weights. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is introduced in the 
form of adjustment costs for changing wages. The wage adjustment costs are borne by the 
household.  
The trade unions set wages by maximizing a weighted average of the utility functions of 
Ricardian and credit-constrained households. The wage rule is obtained by equating a 
weighted average of the marginal utility of leisure to a weighted average of the marginal 




1 , 1 ,
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The wage mark-up fluctuates around 1/θ , which is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution 
between different varieties of labour services. Fluctuation in the wage mark-up arises because 
of wage adjustment costs. Real benefits in GDP prices equal the replacement rate rimes the 
real wage: 
(48) Ut t tBEN b w=   
The ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal utility of consumption is a natural 
measure of the reservation wage. If the ratio is equal to the consumption wage net of benefit 
payments to non-working parts of the labour force, the household is indifferent between, on 
the one hand, supplying an additional unit of labour and spending the additional income on 
consumption or, on the other hand, not increasing labour supply. 
The specification (47) also allows for real wage inertia wρ . Unit labour costs are 
/t t t tulc w L Y= , which equals the wage share in domestic income. 
 
A.5 Fiscal policy 
42 
 
Government consumption, investment and transfers respond to changes in GDP growth and to  
deviations of public debt and deficit from target values.  Real government consumption and 
are set according to the following policy rules:  
 
(49)   
 
1 11
1 1 1 54
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ln( / ) ) ( ) ( ) ,CG CGG G G G B T DEF CGt tt lag t t t Y tY Y
t t t t
B Bc c c c Y Y g b def u
P Y P Y
τ τ τ τ Τ− −− − −
− − − −
∆
− = − + − − − − − +  
 
, ,1 11
1 1 1 54
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ln( / ) ) ( ) ( ) ,IG IGG G G G B IG T DEF IG IGt tt lag t t t Y tY Y
t t t t
B Bi i i i Y Y g b def u
P Y P Y
τ τ τ τ Τ− −− − −
− − − −
∆
− = − + − − − − − +
 where /
G
t t tc G Z≡  and /
G G
t t ti I Z≡  denote government consumption and investment normalized by 
the ‘total’ technology trend .tZ  20 Yg  is the steady state quarterly growth rate of GDP;  Tb is 
the target government debt/GDP ratio, and Tdef is the associated deficit target.  uCG and uIG 
are white noise disturbances.  
 The government provides unemployment benefits to the unemployed , and also makes 
other transfer payments to the two households. All transfers are lump sum payments. 
Unemployment benefits are modeled as a subsidy to leisure ,tL L−  where 
c rL L L= +  is the total 
time endowment, while r ct t tL L L= +  equals aggregate hours worked. Unemployment benefits 
equal the wage rate times the benefit ratio .Ub  Real transfers also respond to deviations of the 
public debt and deficit from target values:   
(50)                 , ,1 1 2
1 1 1 1
(1 ) ( ) ( )U B TR T DEF TR T TRt t tt t t t
t t t t
B B Btr b w L b def u
Y P Y P
τ τ− − −
− − − −
−
= − − − − − +
 
where uTR is an exogenous autocorrelated shock.  
 Government revenue, ,GtR   consists of taxes on consumption and residential 
investment and on income to physical capital:  
 (51)         [ ]G W C C C H H K It t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tR w L p C p I (Y - w L ) - K pτ τ τ τ δ= + + + .  
The current version of the paper assumes constant consumption and capital income taxes:  
, .W W K Kt tτ τ τ τ= =  By contrast, the labour tax rate is an increasing function of GDP normalized 
by the ‘total’ technology trend: 10 ( / ) ,
WW W
t t tY Z
ττ τ=  with 0 1, 0.
W Wτ τ >   
Government debt ( tB ) evolves according to 
(52) 1(1 )
B C G C G G
t t t t t t t t tB i B P C P I tr R−= + + + + − . 
where  Bti  is the implicit interest rate the government pays on its debt, which depends on the 
average maturity structure of sovereign debt ( )1(1 Bρ− ) and the policy rate augmented by a 
mark-up made up of a  sovereign risk premium, which is assumed to depend on the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio and an autoregressive term.  
(53) [ ]rpbtttBBtBBtBBt YBYBrpremmupiii ερρ +−++−+= − )//()1(1  
 
Interest rate spread on Spanish sovereign debt 
The one-period interest rate on Spanish government bonds equals the EA policy rate plus an 
exogenous ‘risk premium’:   
                                                 
20 tZ  is a geometric weighted average  of TFP and investment efficiency, such that GDP normalized by tZ  is 
stationary (definition of tZ  to be added).  
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(54)                                                                 ,
EA RPREM
t t ti i u= +                                                      
where RPREMtu  is an exogenous random disturbance whose unconditional mean is zero. Before 
EMU, Spanish sovereign debt rates exceeded the risk free interest rate in the rest of the Euro 
Area. In December 1995 the EU Council announced that the Euro would irrevocably be 
launched on January 1, 1999. During the period 1996-1998 the interest rate spread between 
Spain and the rest of the EA was gradually eliminated—that spread was close to zero between 
the launch of the Euro and the eruption of the Spanish sovereign debt crisis in 2010.  
 
A.6 Monetary policy 
Euro Area monetary policy is set according to an augmented Taylor-style interest rate 
feedback rule:  
(55) ,1 11 4 44 4(1 ) (1 )[ ( ln( / ) ) ( ln( / ) )]
EA r r EA r r EA EA r EA EA EA EA r
t t t t Y t t Y ti r i P P GDP GDP gπρ ρ ρ τ π τ ε− − −= − + + − − + − +
so that the policy rate responds to a lagged interest rate, the year-on-year Euro Area CPI 
inflation rate, and to the year-on-year growth rate of Euro Area real GDP, and to a random 
disturbance. We assume that during the transition period, the convergence of Spanish rates to 





A.7  Financial integration  
 
We define as follows the (nominal) net-foreign asset positions of the three model regions, 
denominated in domestic currency: 
 
(56)   , , ,( ( )) /ES F ES ROW c F NF F Yt t t t t t tNFA B E B B P Y= − +  
(57)   , , , , , , ,( ( )( / )) /REA F REA REA ROW c F REA B NF F REA B ES REA Y REA REAt t t t t t tNFA B E B s B s size size P Y= + +  
(58)   , , , , , ,( ( (1 ) (1 ))( / )) /ROW F ROW c F REA B NF F REA B ES ROW Y ROW ROWt t t t t tNFA B B s B s size size P Y= + − + −  
where EStE and 
REA
tE  are the exchange rates of, respectively, ES currency and REA currency 
with respect to ROW currency and , ,F ROW F REA Ft t tB B B= − − . 
The exchange rate of the EA currency against ROW currency is a weighted average of the 
rates of depreciation of ES and REA currencies against ROW, with weights s and 1-s, 
respectively: 
 
 (59)                                , , ,(1 )EA ROW ES ROW REA ROWt t tE sE s E= + −  . 
with s being the share of Spanish GDP in EA GDP, that is , /ES EAs size size= . Since the 
creation of the Euro, the exchange rates ,ES REAtE  have been constant and 
, , , .EA ROW REA ROW ES ROWt t tE E E= =  
The differential between Spanish interest and the REA rates is linked to the net-foreign 




                         ,( )( / )REA EA REA ES REA ROW REA rpremet t t t ti i rpreme NFA NFA size size u= − − + , 
( )( / )ES EA ES REA ES ROW rpremet t t t ti i rpreme NFA NFA size size u= − − +
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where rpremetu  and 
,REA rpreme
tu  are stationary disturbances that drives wedges between returns on 
Spanish, REA and ROW bonds and rpreme is an important parameter which links the 
differential in the cost of borrowing to the respective foreign assets positions. 
Similarly, the differential between the Euro Area policy rate and the ROW interest parity 
conditions is defined as a function of the ROW net-foreign asset: 
 
(60)                      ,1( ) /
ROW EA EA EA EA EA rpreme ROW




Net foreign asset position 
 
The trade balance, ( ) /X Mt t t t t tTBY p X p M Y= − , is the value of net exports to GDP. We allow 
the trade balance to be non-zero in equilibrium in order to provide a more realistic description 
of the imbalances in trade experienced in Spain. Net exports together with net interest 
receipts, net foreign liabilities and the exogenous balance of primary incomes and transfers (
tTA ), determine the evolution of the net foreign assets: 
 
(61)       , , , , , ,1 1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
F c F NF F F F c F c F NF F NF F X M
t t t t t t t t t t t t t tB B B r B r B r B P X P M TA− − − − − −− + = + − + − + + − +  





B. Detailed list of shocks 
 
List of all shocks used in the model 
 
International shocks 
   Financial Aggregate Euro Area shocks  
• shock to interest rate spread between EA rate and ROW  rate  
• EA monetary shock 
    Financial REA shocks 
• RoEA price mark-up shock 
• shock to interest rate spread between EA rate and RoEA rate  
    Real REA shocks 
• RoEA import shock  
• RoEA demand shock  
• RoEA supply shock 
    Financial ROW shocks 
• ROW price mark-up shock (financial) 
• ROW monetary shock (financial) 
     Real ROW shocks 
• ROW demand shock 
• ROW supply shock 
• ROW import shock 
     Spain trade/external financial shocks 
• exchange rate shock ES/EA 
• import price mark-up shock 
• export price mark-up shock 
• shock to Spanish net-foreign-asset position 
      Spain trade/external real shocks 
• shock to Spanish import 
 
Domestic shocks 
Real HH shocks 
• preference shock of domestic HH 
      Financial HH shocks 
• shock to  household domestic LTV ratio 
• shock to household foreign LTV ratio 
• domestic price mark-up shock 
• housing  price mark-up 
     Labour market financial shocks 
• wage markup 
     Labour market real shocks 
• shock to non-participating rate 
• shock to retirement 
• labour demand shock 
Firms financial shocks 
• shock to housing risk premium 
• land risk premium shock 
• risk premium on non-residential capital 
• shock to firm domestic LTV ratio 
• shock to firm foreign LTV ratio 
Technology real shocks 
• labour augmenting technology shock 
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• shock on investment specific productivity 
      Technology financial shocks 
• consumption price shock 
Interest spreads financial shocks 
• shock to firm loan interest rate 
• shock to household loan interest rate 
• shock to the risk spread on government bonds 
• domestic interest rate spread (ES/EA) 
Government real shocks 
• lump sum tax shock 
• shock to transfers 
• Shock to government consumption 
• deficit measurement error  
• shock to government investment 
      Government financial shock 




C.  Priors and estimated parameters (baseline model) 
 






Prior s.d. Posterior 
mean  
Posterior s.d. Interval 
dcc Beta 0.5 0.15 0.7003 0.0820 0.5728 0.839 
γucap , 2 Gamma 0.02 0.008 0.0373 0.0101 0.0207 0.0536 
τ1CG Beta -0.1 0.04 -0.0269 0.0117 -0.0443 -0.0077 
γM Beta 0.5 0.2 0.2405 0.1166 0.0414 0.42 
γH Gamma 30 20 48.487 17.417 21.2598 75.9882 
γJ , H Gamma 30 20 87.5306 25.3068 45.8826 127.8108 
γK Gamma 30 20 11.8123 4.9951 4.6367 20.0108 
γ I Gamma 15 10 19.0061 7.4258 7.0643 30.5635 
γL Gamma 30 20 18.991 4.6834 11.2885 26.472 
γP Beta 4 2 7.1984 1.1638 5.3133 9.0823 
γPcons t r Gamma 30 20 34.17 13.7716 13.0926 53.5162 
γPhouse Gamma 30 20 8.0563 5.4165 0.7993 15.8222 
γPM Gamma 4 2 1.1831 0.5602 0.3418 2.0318 
γPX Gamma 4 2 0.8949 0.4662 0.1978 1.6118 
γW Gamma 12 4 26.5103 4.8845 18.6531 34.5018 
τ lagCG Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9606 0.009 0.9445 0.9763 
η  Beta 0.7 0.1 0.7284 0.0524 0.6455 0.8114 
τ1IG Beta -0.1 0.04 -0.0184 0.0093 -0.0327 -0.0034 
τ lagIG Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8769 0.04456 0.8078 0.9504 
κ Gamma 1 0.4 1.3137 0.39433 0.6474 1.9245 
,XI dρ  
Beta 0.85 0.06 0.8832 0.0616 0.7962 0.9685 
,XI fρ  
Beta 0.85 0.06 0.9035 0.0491 0.8262 0.9683 
,XINF fρ  Beta 0.85 0.075 0.9236 0.0382 0.8625 0.9771 
XINFρ  
Beta 0.85 0.075 0.8648 0.0823 0.7359 0.9759 
ρη Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9077 0.0361 0.855 0.9657 
ρη , Constr Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8322 0.0571 0.7382 0.9297 
ρη , M Beta 0.85 0.075 0.9269 0.0349 0.8738 0.9832 
ρη , X Beta 0.85 0.075 0.9572 0.0190 0.9276 0.9881 
Ρgby Beta 0.5 0.2 0.846 0.0454 0.7759 0.9229 
ρN Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9072 0.0219 0.8726 0.9435 
ρPC PM Beta 0.5 0.2 0.2798 0.1381 0.0447 0.4951 
ρer Beta 0.5 0.2 0.4665 0.0416 0.3989 0.5343 
Zρ  
Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8409 0.0493 0.7626 0.9232 
,Z Hρ  Beta 0.85 0.075 0.9396 0.0142 0.9163 0.963 
ρrp land Beta 0.85 0.075 0.9686 0.0142 0.9463 0.9921 
τc Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8591 0.0700 0.7496 0.9568 
τc,F Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8036 0.1143 0.6619 0.9496 
τNF Beta 0.85 0.06 0.8629 0.0620 0.7551 0.9549 
rpk Beta 0.025 0.006 0.0323 0.0034 0.0267 0.0379 
sd Beta 0.72 0.012 0.7463 0.0095 0.7309 0.7621 
sfp Beta 0.7 0.1 0.7798 0.0944 0.6287 0.9419 
sfpconstr Beta 0.7 0.1 0.9228 0.0555 0.8459 1 
sfphouse Beta 0.7 0.1 0.8047 0.0901 0.6587 0.9553 
sfpm Beta 0.7 0.1 0.8293 0.0967 0.6852 0.9926 
sfpx Beta 0.7 0.1 0.794 0.1007 0.628 0.9577 
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sfw Beta 0.7 0.1 0.6789 0.09170 0.5306 0.8197 
σH Gamma 0.5 0.1 0.5647 0.1129 0.3857 0.7396 
σM Gamma 1.5 0.25 1.1203 0.0540 1.0322 1.204 
σ1 Gamma 1 0.25 0.8963 0.1848 0.611 1.1811 
σL Beta 0.5 0.2 0.2825 0.1270 0.0732 0.4814 
sL Beta 0.3 0.1 0.2339 0.0723 0.1172 0.3471 
sr Beta 0.5 0.1 0.5162 0.0521 0.432 0.6017 
τ Beta 0.1 0.04 0.1629 0.0121 0.1426 0.1828 
τB Beta 0.02 0.01 0.0126 0.0022 0.0089 0.0162 
τDEF Beta 0.02 0.01 0.009 0.0043 0.0019 0.0153 
τB , IG Beta 0.05 0.02 0.0555 0.0196 0.0242 0.0885 
τDEF , IG Beta 0.05 0.02 0.0502 0.0196 0.0174 0.0819 
τB , TR Beta 0.02 0.01 0.0331 0.0120 0.0134 0.0532 
τDEF , TR Beta 0.02 0.01 0.0219 0.0105 0.0055 0.0379 
rpdebt Beta 0.003 0.0012 0.003 0.0012 9.47E-04 0.0049 
bU Beta 0.3 0.1 0.3789 0.0665 0.2697 0.4927 
ρTR Beta 0.85 0.075 0.9437 0.0293 0.902 0.9885 
cχ  
Beta 0.25 0.1 0.2154 0.0821 0.0757 0.3454 
rρ  
Beta 0.7 0.1 0.8883 0.0206 0.8535 0.9214 
r
πτ  
Beta 2 0.4 1.5177 0.2315 1.1615 1.8601 
r
Yτ  
















εUC Gamma 0.02 0.008 0.0319 0.0071 0.02 0.0434 
,XI dε  Gamma 0.04 0.016 0.0558 0.0238 0.0174 0.0912 
,XI fε  Gamma 0.04 0.016 0.0585 0.0184 0.0266 0.0881 
εe r Gamma 0.01 0.004 0.0012 9.91E-05 9.96E-04 0.0013 
εη  Gamma 0.02 0.008 0.0139 0.0027 0.0096 0.0184 
εηCons t r Gamma 0.1 0.04 0.1302 0.0379 0.0685 0.193 
εη , M Gamma 0.02 0.008 0.0319 0.0055 0.0228 0.0404 
εη , X Gamma 0.02 0.008 0.0205 0.0038 0.0143 0.0262 
εCG Gamma 0.005 0.002 0.0018 0.0001 0.0015 0.0021 
ε IG Gamma 0.005 0.002 0.0032 0.0003 0.0026 0.0039 
ε IM  Gamma 0.005 0.002 0.0026 0.0008 0.0012 0.004 
εN Gamma 0.05 0.02 0.0794 0.0129 0.0579 0.0989 
εM , E A Gamma 0.0025 0.001 7.69E-04 7.13E-05 6.54E-04 8.87E-04 
εPC  Gamma 0.0025 0.001 0.0037 0.0003 0.0032 0.0042 
Z
tε  Gamma 0.005 0.002 0.0083 0.0019 0.0052 0.0116 
,Z H
tε  Gamma 0.01 0.004 0.0092 0.0025 0.0053 0.0131 
εrp l and Gamma 0.01 0.004 0.0135 0.0043 0.0068 0.0203 
εTR  Gamma 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.0009 0.0017 0.0044 
εW Gamma 0.02 0.008 0.0303 0.0065 0.0192 0.0403 
,XINF dε
 
Gamma 0.04 0.016 0.0416 0.0165 0.0153 0.0663 
,XINF fε
 
Gamma 0.04 0.016 0.0587 0.0194 0.025 0.0901 
Y
tε  Gamma 0.01 0.004 0.0069 0.0008 0.0055 0.0082 
ε IM, RE A Gamma 0.005 0.002 0.0207 0.0021 0.0171 0.0241 





D. Additional Shock decompositions (baseline model) 
 
















































































































































• one copy: 
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); 
 
• more than one copy or posters/maps: 
from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or 
calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 
 








• via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union 
(http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm). 
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